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THE JOHN WESLEY POWELL STUDENT RESEARCH CONFERENCE - APRIL 2008 
Oral Presentation 01 .2 
ECONOMIC RETURNS TO mGHER EDUCATION: 
SIGNALING V. HUMAN CAPITAL THEORY 
Jim KjeUand and Michael Seeborg* 
Economics Department, Illinois Wesleyan University 
It is general knowledge that individuals with higher levels of education will, on average, earn 
higher wages in the labor market. And while this correlation has be established, the causal 
relationship behind those returns to education is less clear. Past research has been done in an 
attempt to determine the mechanism by which education increases earnings. Human Capital 
Theory argues intuitively that education endows an individual with productivity-enhancing 
human capital, which translates into higher wages in the labor market. Signaling Theory argues 
instead that education acts merely as a signal of inherent human capital, and that it is the inherent 
human capital, not acquired human capital, that determines a worker' s  wage. This study 
employs OLS regression and is an extension of a previous study carried out by Chevalier et al 
(2004). Using controls for inherent ability and motivation, it explores the effects of inherent 
human capital on productivity and wages, and applies that understanding to an assessment of the 
respective merits of both Signaling and Human Capital Theory. 
